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Key events 
Electoral voting systems have been the subject of several cybersecurity 
reviews, and speculation about them being vulnerable.  In 2017, 
Communications Security Establishment noted that electronic voting 
tabulation may be vulnerable to third party cyberattacks (CSE, 2017).  In 
March 2018, a report from Brazil demonstrated it was possible to attack 
the voting machine (Aranha et. al., 2018). Moreover, a 2018 report by 
Elections BC includes reference to the requirement that voting machines 
must maintain an internet connection, thus creating a vulnerability for a 
potential cyber-attack (Archer, 2018).  
Nature of Discussion 
This report is organized into the following points: a) what is the specific 
electronic voting vulnerability being considered (SQL Injection)?; b) 
how are these attacks carried out against the electoral system?; and c) 
what is the impact of a cyberattack on the integrity of voting process 
(e.g. balloting, voter confidence, and electoral outcome)?   
Background 
Traditional electoral systems consist of a number of physical checks and 
balances between identification of a voter, validation of their vote, and 
the counting of the final vote.  Electronic voting introduces one more 
level of accountability, but also increases levels of vulnerability. One 
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such vulnerability is the potential compromising of the electoral 
database, which records the electronic vote. For example,  during the 
Ontario election in June 2018, the province made extensive use of optical 
scan tabulators for vote counting (The Canadian Press, 2018). These 
tabulating machines may be one such system which could potentially be 
exploited in Canada.   
Online voting is not a novel concept. In Estonia, it has been used 
federally since 2005 with mixed results (Springall et al, 2014).  
However, some of the key vulnerabilities in online voting may have been 
demonstrated by Russia, who allegedly attacked the Ukrainian electoral 
system in 2014, which resulted in delayed election reporting (Clayton, 
2014). Moreover, a 2018 paper by Aranha et. al., suggests that a SQL 
attack could be utilized against voting machines to violate the secrecy of 
the ballot by attacking the computer network that the machines are 
connected to. One potential attack vector could be achieved through 
exploiting the communication network transmitting information from 
voting places to headquarters and back. This potential exploit may 
enable the cyber attacker to gain access to the voters’ data set while 
potentially bypassing any security systems that are built directly into the 
voting machines. 
To protect electoral systems, Ontario required municipalities to pass a 
by-law allowing online voting by May, 2017 for the 2018 elections 
(Butler, 2018). However, there appears to be no set of standards for 
online voting or security standards that the municipalities are required to 
adhere to (Porup, 2018).  One possible model for delivering electronic 
voting is being considered by Keith Archer, Chief Electoral Officer in 
British Columbia.  Archer is proposing:  
“[…] a communication network that transmits information from voting 
places to headquarters and back, resulting in an almost instantaneous 
sharing of voter participation information across voting places. This 
allows real-time strike-off of voter participation across voting places, 
protecting the system from multiple votes, while removing the need for 
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the ‘provisional’ absentee ballots of the current model” (Archer, 2018: 
26). 
In New Brunswick,  
“the 2014 election saw malfunctioning software cause issues tallying 
votes - ultimately delaying the release of the election’s final results by 
two hours. Officials say there was never a problem with the tabulation 
machines themselves but that it was a program processing the initial 
results that had a glitch. The program failed to properly transfer polling 
data from a computer server in Fredericton to a website where media 
outlets were gathering results. The software was used to get the results 
to the media as quickly as possible” (Quon, 2018). 
Since the 2014 election New Brunswick has since changed systems 
and data validation processes, prior to their election in September 
2018. The article notes “some votes disappeared from the website 
during the delay, which prompted speculation about the validity of 
the election.  Despite the glitches, the final vote counts were 
accurate” (Quon, 2018). 
Key Points of Discussion and West Coast Perspectives 
Currently, BC Gaming uses the TGS1 standard for testing their 
electronic gaming machines. This is a global standard to protect the 
integrity of the gambling environment, gamblers identity, and 
financial data (Gaming Policy and Enforcement Branch, 2016).  
Could or should provincial and federal electoral agencies, and 
associated electoral voting vendors explore this standard as a 
comparable testing model? 
What can British Columbia learn from Canadian specific examples 
of voting issues related to specific computer software and hardware 
events which interfered with election processes?  For example, how 
did New Brunswick select their current systems and validation 
processes?   
Does British Columbia face the same potential threats as Ontario and 
other electoral regions? Should the province begin to expand the 
accessibility of convenience voting (advanced polls and absentee 
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ballots) to include electronic voting machines and/or remote voting 
systems that would allow electors to cast a ballot from potentially 
insecure places and networks? 
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